多元视角下的建筑企业边界问题探究
摘要：建筑企业的边界问题是项目治理研究领域的重要内容，也是完善工程建设组织模式、优化产业结构的关键所在。从建设项目的特殊性和我国建筑业在转型期的实际出发，通过对交易成本经济学的“主题变奏”来研究这一问题的基本逻辑和内在机理。研究工作在三个层面上展开：一是项目采购环节的模式选择问题；二是工程分包环节的“自制或外购”决策问题；三是项目采购模式和分包模式确定之后的组织界面管理问题。基于此，提出了项目生态位和合约风险指数的概念，以期把更多因素纳入分析框架，进而实现从资产专用性单因素驱动的“火车头”模式到多元驱动模式的扩展。
关键词：建设项目治理组织边界交易成本经济学战略管理方法论多元化
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[2] 亓霞，曾大林，沙凯逊.建筑业“工程分包困局”再探——取消了分包限制又如何？[J].建筑经济，2022(6):5-9.
[3] 陈宏伟.关于工程分包的法与经济学分析[J].建筑经济，2021(2):5-8.
[4] Winch,G.M. Three domains of project organizing[J].International Journal of Project Management,2014(5):721-727.
[5] Williamson,O.E. Transaction cost economics:How it works,where it is headed[J]. De Economist,1998(1):23-58.
[6] Williamson,O.E. The new institutional economics:Taking stock,looking ahead[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,2000(3):595-613.
[7] Rindfleisch,A. Transaction cost theory:Past,present and future[J]. Academy of Marketing Science Review,2020(1–2):85-97.
[8] Cuypers I. R. P. Silverman B. S.,Ertug G.Transaction cost theory:past progress,current challenges,and suggestions for the future[J].Academy of Management Annals,2021(1):111-150.
[9] Coase,R.H. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica,1937(16):386-405.
[10] Williamson,O.E. The economics of governance[J].The American Economic Review,2005(2):1-18.
[11] Macneil,I. R. Contracts:Adjustments of long-term economic relations under classical,neoclassical,and relational contract law[J]. Northwestern University Law Review,1978(6):854-905.
[12] Eccles,R.G. The quasifirm in the construction industry[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,1981(4):335-357.
[13] Sha,K.X. Understanding construction project governance:An inter-organizational perspective[J].International Journal of Architecture,Engineering and Construction,2016(2):117-127.
[14] Knight,F.H. Risk,Uncertainty and Profit[M].Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company,1921.
[15] Ahola,T.,Ruuska,I.,Artto,K. etal. What is project governance and what are its origins?[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2014(8):1321-1332.
[16] Winch,G.M. Project organizing as a problem in information[J]. Construction Management and Economics,2015(2):106-116.
[17] 沙凯逊.建设项目治理十讲[M].北京：中国建筑工业出版社，2017.
[18] Bridge,A.J. Tisdell,C. The determinants of the vertical boundaries of the construction firm[J].Construction Management and Economics,2004(3):807-825.
[19] Sha,K.X. Vertical governance of construction projects:an information cost perspective[J].Construction Management and Economics,2011(11):1137-1147.
[20] Shi,L.,He,Y.J.,Onishi,M. Kobayashi,K. Double Moral Hazard and Risk-Sharing in Construction Projects[J]. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,2021(6):1919-1929.
[21] K re ps,D. Ma rket s a nd H ier a rch ies a nd(Mathematical)Economic Theory,in Glenn Carroll and David Teece,Eds.,Firms,Markets,and Hierarchies[M]. NY:Oxford University Press,1999.
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[24] Schepper,S.D.,Haezendonck,E.,Dooms,M. Transaction cost analysis of public infrastructure delivery[J]. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business,2015(3):441-456.
[25] Almaaz,R.,Zakaria,I.,Odimegwumas,T. C.Comparative Analysis of Alliancing and Public Private Partnership Cost Performance in Australasia Infrastructure Projects[A]. 2020 IOP Conf. Ser.:Earth Environ,Sci. 498 012102.
[26] Xiong,W.,Zhong,N.,Wang,F.,etal. Political opportunism and transaction costs in contractual choice of public–private partnerships[J]. Public Administration,2022(4):1125-1144.
[27] Williamson,O.E. Strategy research:governance and competence perspectives[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1999(12):1087-1108.
[28] Costantino,N.,Pietroforte,R. Subcontracting practices in USA homebuilding—An empirical verification of Eccles’s findings 20 years later[J].European Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management,2002(1):15-23.
[29] Shi,C.,Chen,Y.,Hua,Y.,Tang,Y. Understanding subcontracting organizational arrangements for construction projects in China:integrating capabilities and uncertainty[J]. Engineering,Construction and Architectural Management,2023(6):2381-2399.
[30] Tang,Y.,Chen,Y.,Arditi,D. Meng,F. Effects of the General Contractor’s Governance Capabilities and Project Goals on the Organizational Ar rangement of Subcontracting[J]. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,2021(99):1-14.
[31] 尹贻林，尹航，王丹，等.科层失灵、项目治理与机会主义行为——138例样本的定性比较分析[J].管理工程学报，2022(3):106-117.
[32] Turner,J.R.,Keegan,A. Mechanisms of governance in the project-based organization:Roles of the broker and steward[J]. European Management Journal,2001(3):254-267.
[33] Williamson,O.E. Comparative economic organization:the analysis of discrete structural alternatives[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1991(2):269-296.
[34] Williamson,O.E. Opportunism and its critics[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,1993(2):97-107.
[35] Gomes,L.A.,de V.,Facin,A.L.F.,Salerno,M.S.,etal. Unpacking the Innovation Ecosystem Construct:Evolution,Gaps and Trends[J].Technological Forecasting and Social Change,2018(1):30-48.
[36] 张俊光，王美华.关键链项目组合情境下脆性风险驱动的动态缓冲监控[J/OL].中国管理科学：1-13.
Exploring the Boundary Problem of Construction Firms:A Pluralistic Perspective
Abstract: The boundary problem of construction firms is a major concern in the domain of project governance research. It is also the key to improving the mode of organizing const r uction projects,and optimizing the indust rial st r uct ure. Star ting f rom the particularity of the construction project and the circumstances of China's construction industry in its transitional period,the basic logic and inherent mechanism of this problem are examined by means of ‘variations on themes' of transaction cost economics. The study is conducted at three levels:(1)issues relating to mode selection in project procurement process;(2)issues relating to ‘make or buy' decision in subcontracting process;and(3)issues relating to organizational interface management after the determination of both modes of project procurement and subcontracting. The concept of project ecological niche and that of contractual hazard index are developed so that more factors could be incorporated into the framework,and an expansion from so-called ‘locomotive' mode driven by a single factor of asset specificity to multi-factor driving mode could hence be realized.
Keywords: construction project governance; organizational boundary; transaction cost economics; strategic management; methodological pluralism;
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